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Abstract
Background: Taxation of tobacco, food, alcohol and other beverages has gained renewed attention in responding to 
non-communicable diseases (NCDs). While largely built on evidence from high-income countries (HICs), the projected 
economic and health benefits of these measures have increased calls for their use in price-sensitive low- and middle-
income countries (LMICs). However, uptake has been sporadic and there remains little research on why and how LMICs 
utilise fiscal measures in response to NCDs.
Methods: This scoping review analyses factors influencing the design and implementation of health-related fiscal 
measures in LMICs. Utilising Arksey and O’Malley’s scoping review methodology and Walt and Gilson’s policy triangle, 
we considered the contextual, procedural, content and stakeholder-related factors that influenced measures. 
Results: We identified 75 papers focussing on health-related fiscal measures, with 47 (63%) focused on tobacco, 5 on 
alcohol, 6 on soft drink and 4 studies on food-related fiscal regulation. Thirteen papers analysed multiple measures 
and most papers (n = 66, 88%) were less than a decade old. Key factors enabling the design and implementation of 
measures included localised health and economic evidence, policy championing, inter-ministerial support, and global 
or regional momentum. Impeding factors encompassed negative framing and retaliation by industry, vested interests 
and governmental policy disjuncture. Aligning with theoretic insights from the policy triangle, findings consistently 
demonstrated that the interplay between factors – rather than the presence or absence of particular factors – has the most 
profound impact on policy implementation. 
Conclusion: Given the growing urgency to address NCDs in LMICs, this review highlights the need for recognition and 
rigorous exploration of political economy factors influencing the design and implementation of fiscal measures. Broader 
LMIC-specific empirical research is needed to overcome an implication noted in much of the literature: that mechanisms 
used to enact tobacco taxation are universally applicable to measures targeting foods, alcohol and other beverages. 
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Introduction
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are now the leading 
cause of death and disability, resulting in more than 41 million 
deaths annually and accounting for 71% of global mortality.1-3 
Of the total NCD burden, 80% is attributed to cancer, diabetes, 
cardiovascular disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, conditions that are largely preventable and driven by 
the risk factors of smoking, alcohol consumption, inadequate 
physical activity and poor diet.4 The global escalation in NCDs 
represents a threat to the health of populations, stability and 
responsiveness of health systems and the viability of national 
economic progression.5 It is for these reasons that NCDs have 
been identified by the World Economic Forum as one of the 
greatest global threats to economic development.6
The multisectoral nature of NCD determinants requires 
intervention beyond the health sector and demands policy 
consensus across diverse stakeholders.7 This multisectoral 
approach recognises that many decisions affecting the 
prevalence and impact of NCDs are determined by national 
and international policies related to trade, agriculture, urban 
planning and finance-interested parties in boardrooms of 
national and multinational corporations.7-9 As such, global 
recommendations for addressing NCDs increasingly reference 
and seek to address the underlying social and commercial 
determinants of health.10-12 Global recommendations focusing 
on supporting population behaviour change and minimising 
the impact of health-harming practices by corporations 
through enhanced regulation are bundled into packages such 
as the World Health Organization (WHO) NCD Best Buys.6,13
The use of fiscal measures to limit the impact of health-
harming commodities, such as alcohol and tobacco, is not 
new.14 However, this policy space has gained additional 
attention in the last decade given the escalation of NCDs.15,16 
Fiscal measures targeting tobacco and alcohol are now 
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present in 161 and 156 countries respectively, having gained 
traction from the Framework Convention of Tobacco Control 
(FCTC),17 the Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful use of 
Alcohol18 and the NCD Best Buys.6,19,20 Drawing on tobacco 
and alcohol taxation successes, measures have also been 
adapted and enhanced for use on a broader range of harmful 
commodities.21 Fiscal measures targeting sugar sweetened 
beverages, ultra-processed and energy-dense foods are now 
present in more than 45 countries and local jurisdictions 
globally.22-24
Research analysing the economic implications of fiscal 
measures is vast. However, the health literature in this space 
is concentrated on predictive forecasts and, to a lesser but 
growing extent, empirical ex post studies focused on high-
income countries (HICs).25 Positive findings identifying 
economic and public health gains from fiscal measures 
hence derive almost exclusively from HIC-specific data, 
yet these measures are widely recommended for use in the 
more price sensitive markets of low- and middle-income 
countries (LMICs).25-27 With different political and economic 
contexts, the assumption that the political appetite, policy 
process and potential impact in LMICs will mirror HIC 
case studies is questionable and remains unsubstantiated 
by sufficient evidence.27-29 For example, the introduction of 
sugar sweetened beverage taxation in 31% of HICs compared 
to just 13% of LMICs23 questions whether measures can be 
successfully implemented in the distinctive political and 
economics landscapes of LMICs. 
Although still in its infancy, there is growing research 
interest in fiscal measures in LMICs. Studies by Nakhimosky 
et al,30 Sassi et al,31 Sornpaisarn et al32 have begun to 
demonstrate the economic impact of fiscal measures in 
LMICs specifically. While Bump and Reich’s 2013 analysis of 
tobacco-specific fiscal measures provided one of the earliest 
political economy examples.33 This paper highlighted the 
important but under-researched articulation of the influence 
of political and economic dynamics on policy adoption. More 
recent work includes Wright and colleagues’ study reviewing 
global harmful commodity tax measures25; Hagenaars and 
colleagues’ work on policy content and policy context of 
energy dense food and sugar-sweetened beverage taxation in 
13 (majority HIC) case studies24; and Bridge and colleagues’ 
overview of LMIC’s experiences in implementing soft drink 
specific fiscal measures.34 Building on these examples, but 
utilising a systematic scoping review and focussing on LMIC 
specifically, this paper aims to: (1) map evidence relating to 
policy content, stakeholder-related, procedural and contextual 
factor that shape harmful commodities focused fiscal 
measures; (2) identify points of convergence and divergence 
across the LMIC literature; and (3) compare LMIC specific 
findings with fiscal measures focused literature from HICs. 
Methods
This study utilised scoping review methods developed 
by Arksey and O’Malley35 to identify, map and highlight 
potential gaps in LMIC policy process-relevant fiscal 
measures research. Detail on the application of the 5-stage 
framework, encompassing: (1) question identification, (2) 
study identification, (3) study selection, (4) data charting, and 
(5) collation and synthesis, is outlined below.
The research question emerged through iterative 
exploration of the broad themes of ‘fiscal policy’ and ‘NCDs.’ 
Acknowledging the breadth of this domain, source and 
study selection sought to balance comprehensiveness with 
feasibility.35 
Database Search Strategy
Four databases (PubMed, Embase, ProQuest, and Scopus) 
were searched using the key terms ‘health policy,’ ‘regulatory,’ 
‘LMICs,’ ‘NCDs,’ ‘harmful commodities’ and their derivatives 
separated by the Boolean operator ‘AND’ for all except NCDs 
and harmful commodities where ‘OR’ was utilised to more 
comprehensively canvas relevant papers. We used broad 
search terms to capture additional fiscal measures content 
in research discussing policy responses to NCDs and their 
determinants more broadly. The full search strategy can be 
found in Supplementary file 1. 
Database searches returned 5047 papers, yielding 4669 
original English works once duplicates were removed (March 
2019). As represented in Figure, articles were then excluded 
sequentially by the first author in consultation with the third/
senior author based on title, abstract and full text. Inclusion 
criteria centred on papers demonstrating a focus on LMICs and 
policy process while also exhibiting an explicit link between 
health and fiscal measures. Application of this criteria led to 
the exclusion of 3660 papers based on titles. More specific 
criteria were subsequently applied to abstract and full-text 
screening to identify papers that provided explicit accounts 
of agenda setting, design and implementation of fiscal 
measures. These criteria excluded non-empirical works and 
prevalence, predictive, experimental, and outcome/impact-
focused studies. A summary of inclusion/exclusion criteria 
can be found in Supplementary file 2. Abstract screening of 
1009 works excluded 914 papers with many lacking empirical 
basis (n = 211) or a specific focus on fiscal measures (n = 296). 
Full text screening of the remaining 95 papers excluded an 
additional 44 lacking underpinning policy process focus 
(n = 23). This left a final set of 51 peer-reviewed research 
papers and book chapters. References lists of included papers 
and excluded papers of note were searched by hand resulting 
in the inclusion of 12 additional resources. 
Grey Literature Search Strategy
Grey literature was also sourced through selected agencies: 
WHO, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). The grey literature search strategy applied the same 
key words and inclusion/exclusion parameters as those used 
in the academic database search and was undertaken by the 
first author in consultation with the third author. Publication 
repositories and search functions on each website were 
searched first. However, acknowledging the often-limited 
functionality of these mechanisms, Google domain searches 
were also conducted. Most of the reviewed reports and 
publications were excluded given their prospective focus on 
the projected benefits of measures. A total of 12 grey literature 
publications were included. 
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A final set of 75 papers, reports and book chapters were 
obtained for analysis through the combined database, grey 
literature and hand search strategies.
Data Synthesis and Analysis
We conducted data charting, collation and synthesis using 
an iterative approach and following Ritchie and Spencer’s36 
qualitative data analysis framework. Data familiarisation was 
undertaken by the first author by generating a list of key ideas 
covered by the 75 included papers. These ideas formed the 
basis for an initial codebook workshopped by the first and 
third author, found in Supplementary file 3. A first round of 
coding was conducted using NVivo 12.37 The first and third 
author reviewed these codes and considered the data in light 
of various theoretical frameworks. Walt and Gilson’s38 policy 
triangle was selected to further refine analysis. The policy 
triangle is derived from LMIC-specific policy analysis and has 
been used in similar studies, including those by Hagenaars 
et al24 and Downs et al.39 While acknowledging inevitable 
overlap, blurred boundaries and dynamic interaction between 
the domains of policy content, actors, process and context, 
it was selected given its ability to support the identification 
of diverse factors and dynamics influencing the design and 
implementation of fiscal measures. 
Recoding was undertaken utilising a refined codebook 
with codes pre-grouped corresponding with each policy 
triangle domain and, in the case of contextual factors, further 
refined by Leitcher’s40 framework of situations, structural, 
cultural and international/exogenous factors.38 Coding 
summaries were produced and used to visually map findings; 
these maps supported interpretation and write-up, using 
both deductive and inductive reasoning. The first author 
undertook preliminary synthesis of thematic areas, followed 
by consultation and critical evaluation by the second and 
third authors to provide additional depth of analysis. Table 1 
summarises the 4 domains of the policy triangle and respective 
themes and subthemes that emerged during analysis.
Results
Results indicate that the study of policy processes of health-
related fiscal measures in LMICs is an emerging field. The 
earliest included paper in this study was published in 1998 
while most papers (n = 64) were published between 2009 and 
early 2019. Of the 75 papers identified, 47 studies (63%) focused 
on tobacco-related fiscal measures. Alcohol was the focus of 
5 studies, while soft drink and food-related fiscal regulation 
were the focus of 6 and 4 papers, respectively. Thirteen papers 
sought to analyse more than one commodity-related fiscal 
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measure. Utilising the World Bank 2019 categorization of 
income status,41 low-income countries were the focus of just 
2 papers. Nineteen papers (25%) focused on fiscal measures 
initiated in lower-middle income countries while 28 (37%) 
analysed upper-middle income countries. The remaining 26 
papers (35%) made comparisons across multiple countries 
with varying socioeconomic statuses. Geographically, Asia 
(n = 21) and Africa (n = 20) were the predominant regions 
of focus. South and Central America (n = 10) and the Pacific 
(n = 6) also featured prominently. While just 2 papers focused 
on Europe and one paper on the Middle East, this needs to be 
considered in light of the study’s LMIC-focus. Fifteen papers 
utilised cross-regional comparisons. A table incorporating 
the main attributes of each paper and their identification of 
themes linked to Walt and Gilson’s38 policy triangle can be 
found in Supplementary file 4. 
Policy Content
The prescriptive detail and technical content outlined in 
policy documents is integral to conveying and achieving 
policy objectives. Two major themes were identified in the 
analysis of policy content: earmarking of revenue and tiered 
taxation measures.
Earmarking
Earmarking (ie, assigning government revenue to a specific 
purpose)42 was a commonly discussed policy mechanism in 
the reviewed literature. Administered through formal legal 
process in some instances and more symbolic forms of policy 
in others, the earmarking of funds garnered support for 
fiscal measures in some cases while fuelling inter-ministerial 
conflicts in others.
The benefits of earmarking to fiscal measure adoption 
were examined by 12 papers spanning the Pacific, Asia, 
South America, and Africa.15,42-52 Papers identified varied 
applications of dedicated revenue including additional non-
specific budgetary allocations to health51; the development of 
health promotion funds or foundations15,43,47,50-52; subsidies for 
healthier alternatives15,50; tagged funding for organisational 
units45,49; and equity-based measures dedicating funds to 
universal health coverage or reparations for affected farmers 
and communities.42-44,46,48 While linked to diverse goals, 
earmarked funds can garner public and political support 
for fiscal measures by acting as a traceable policy output; 
overcoming a common retort that measures purely focus on 
revenue generation.44,47,53 In contrast however, a number of 
papers also identified earmarking to circumvent general public 
financial management; fuelling inter-ministerial conflicts and 
stalling or mitigating fiscal measures.42,54-57 Given the overlap 
between the domains of policy content and policy process, 
deliberative decision-making surrounding earmarking will be 
further discussed in the policy process domain. 
Taxation Scope, Rate and Tiered Structures
Most fiscal measures in LMICs target single commodities 
with rigid parameters. Broader measures in some Small 
Island Developing States and Mexico are rare exceptions.51,58-60 
This well-defined focus on a single commodity may permit 
consumers to substitute purchases with similarly unhealthy 
products, potentially undermining the health impact of the 
measure.24,51 However, as Hagenaars et al24 argue, a well-
defined scope strengthens governments’ defence of measures 
in the face of corporate, community or international trade 
disputes. The scope of implemented measures may thus 
reflect a trade-off between public and political acceptability 
of the measure and effectiveness insofar as its impact on 
population health.
Literature also outlined diversity in the type of taxation 
prescribed. Taxation generally encompassed combinations of 
specific, ad valorem (a proportion of the estimated product 
value), value added and import taxations. Taxation rates also 
varied between and within commodities from as little as 
US$0.05 per packet of cigarette in Costa Rica,61 to as much 
as a 300% import levy on turkey tails in Samoa.50,62 Variability 
Table 1. Description of the Policy Triangle Domains and Identification of Themes38,40
Domains Description of Domains Identified Themes 
Content The technical content or prescriptive detail included in policy documents.
•	 Earmarking
•	 Taxation scope, rate and tiered structure 
Actors The individuals, groups and organisations who interact with and influence policy.
•	 The influence of industry
•	 Policy champions
•	 Civil society engagement
•	 Multilateral actors
Process
The actions that influence how issues are recognised and how 




•	 Inter-ministerial policy dynamics
•	 Implementation






International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–15 5
across measures and contexts indicates that fiscal measures 
are often designed to reflect local needs even if the catalyst for 
their use was external, such as ‘global best practice’ guidelines 
or the experience of other nations.
Governance and administrative benefits of simplified 
and uniform taxation measures were explicated by 
some papers,48,63,64 yet tiered structures, with rates based 
on production capacity or concentration of particular 
ingredients, were also common.55,59,65-68 Tiered taxations are 
promoted by a growing body of literature, including Baker et 
al53 and Roubal55 in relation to sweetened drinks, as a means 
of incentivising product reformulation.46,48,51 However, other 
sources suggest that tiered structures associated with some 
commodities can reflect industry involvement in weakening 
measures; ensuring that they are geared towards competitors 
or smaller fragments of the market.46,63,66 This has been the 
case with tobacco in Indonesia, where tiered measures have 
embedded conditions favourable to industry.65-68 As alluded 
to by Williams64 and Kaiser et al,48 if insufficiently monitored, 
tiered measures may also complicate administration and risk 
diminishing the health impact of fiscal measures. 
Policy Actors
Policy actors are individuals or groups who, formally or 
informally, are involved in the policy process.69 However, who 
is considered a policy actor, the power they wield and how 
interests are negotiated in formulating policy, depends on 
context and process. 
The Influence of Industry 
Industry influence was the most commonly identified theme 
across the literature, covered by 88% (n = 66) of sources. 
Spanning conceptualisation, design, implementation 
and sustainability of fiscal measures, industry influence 
encompassed a range of tactics, criticisms and defences 
utilised by national and international corporations whose 
products were subject to proposed or introduced taxations. 
The literature describes industries’ use of pre-emptive 
action to stave off regulatory measures. Intentional framing of 
industry activity as a significant source of LMIC employment 
and contributor to gross domestic product was a common 
tactic used to influence public and political opinion of fiscal 
measures.47-49,53,60,64,68,70-83 Framing was often coupled with 
the projection of negative ramifications for economically-
vulnerable primary producers.48,57,65,71,73,78,81,82,84,85 This tactic 
was explicitly used by the International Tobacco Growers 
Association in response to mounting pressure for tobacco 
taxation in sub-Saharan Africa.82 Framing of economic flow-
on effects permits industry advocates to paint fiscal measures 
as not only a threat to their bottom line but also to primary 
producers, employees and national economic prosperity. 
By extension, Mialon et al86 and Chavez44 also highlight the 
industry threat of offshoring; claiming fiscal measures to 
undermine the economic viability of local production. Such 
threats strike at LMICs’ economic interests and may ignite or 
fuel inter-ministerial conflicts.70,75,87,88 In some cases, threats 
have been compounded with real or perceived threats of 
retaliative trade action.33,50,59,73,86,89,90 
Industry advocates also commonly highlight 
perceived unintended consequences of fiscal measures. 
Commonly identified consequences include cigarette 
smuggling33,42,45,48,54,56,57,61,67,70,73,81,90-97; a shift towards informal 
home-brewed alcohol48; and food and beverage unaffordability, 
nutrient deficiency and dehydration.64,91 Findings from 
Abedian et al and Coriakula et al53,98 suggest strategic links to 
the media, or indeed media ownership itself, to perpetuate this 
framing in the public sphere. Corporate social responsibility 
initiatives are also a common industry tactic to seek favourable 
public positioning.64,68,77,90,99 These covert industry tactics are 
also coupled with more overt mechanisms for mitigating 
the adoption of measures. Common techniques include 
fostering and embracing ties to the political and economic 
elite46,75,77,81,84,86,87,99,100; funding or supporting political 
parties86; and establishing lobbying and front groups prone 
to deception, disputing evidence and directly interfering in 
policy process.15,42,46,47,49,51,53,55,56,59,60,63,65,66,68,71,73,79,85,86,94,96-99,101-104 
Industry interference often results in stalled or diluted fiscal 
mechanisms; undermining the strength and sustainability 
of measures.45,49,51,53,61,66,68,73,79,81,82,84,87,89,93,94,97,99,102,103,105,106 Lack 
of confidence in the relative advantage of different policy 
options is also commonly exploited by industry advocates 
as an opportunity to propose alternative, self-regulatory 
measures.55,59,67,86
Following the implementation of fiscal measures, corporate 
retaliation is sustained. Responses often align with previous 
pre-emptive action and seek to minimise impact on profits. 
Responses include offshoring to more favourable economic 
conditions, as noted by Holden & Lee in Central America100; 
restructuring manufacturing or labelling to exploit tiered 
or poorly constructed measures65,101; pursuing trade or legal 
recourse53; adjusting price to maintain market share or 
profitability92,95,107; and paying further lip service to, if not 
actively engaging in smuggling as identified by Van Walbeek.56 
Policy Champions
Forty-six papers (61%) detailed the influence of 
political commitment and leadership on the design and 
implementation of fiscal measures. Studies highlighted 
that effective implementation is contingent upon sustained 
endorsement and policy championing by executive levels 
of government.46,48,49,52,54,56,60,62,63,68,79-82,84,87,97,98,101,108-111 Most 
commonly, this consisted of public advocacy for measures by 
Presidents, Prime Ministers and national Ministers of Health. 
However, motivation underpinning elite support varied and 
included electoral commitments to tax or health reform48,60,80; 
changing political climates, as was the case in post-Apartheid 
South Africa56,71,81,82,84,97 and the fall of the New Order in 
Indonesia68; and personal convictions such as Prime Minister 
Erdogan in Turkey,109 President Yar’Adua in Nigeria110 and 
President Batlle in Uruguay.108 Sources indicate that the 
efficacy of state actor policy championing improved when 
advocacy was evidence-informed and recognised the harms 
associated with particular commodities.42,48,49,79,101 Mapa-
Tassoa et al78 identified that ad-hoc and reactive instances of 
policy support by political elites were more likely to result in 
under-resourced, conflicting and piecemeal policy responses. 
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Similar findings were echoed by Vateesatoket,52 who 
emphasised senior health experts to have a more sustained 
commitment to measures than career politicians.
Papers that analysed unsuccessful measures found that 
these measures were commonly undermined by a lack of 
sustained political commitment.65,74,75,78,92,96,104,105,112 Political 
ambivalence or lack of support at elite levels was often driven 
by industry framing of the perceived economic and political 
risks of taxation.42,65,74,85,93 As identified by Barraclough 
and Morrow72, the combination of industry framing and 
political ambivalence commonly resulted in political elites 
compromising their regulatory responsibilities in favour of 
potential political and economic gains. The scarcity of financial 
and human resources in the health sector also resulted in the 
prioritisation of responses to communicable diseases at the 
expense of actions to address NCDs.49,76,87,89,104,105,112 Ferreira-
Borges et al89 further highlight that insufficient prioritisation 
of NCDs can be reinforced by the funding priorities of 
international donors. 
Civil Society Engagement
Civil society engagement was identified as integral to 
successful fiscal measures in 35 papers (47%). Civil society 
groups included local, national and international research 
agencies and academics, special interest communities, and 
non-government organisations (NGOs) whose interests were 
strategically aligned.15,42,48,52,61,82 Spanning diverse contexts and 
commodities, these bodies often shaped public and political 
agendas,33,76,87 disseminated policy-relevant research,61,113 
countered industry claims,73,82,110 and held governments 
to account.42,48,52,55,56,60 As demonstrated by lobbying from 
health professionals, researchers and civil society activists 
during the introduction of tobacco-related measures in South 
Africa,71,81,84 effective civil society groups often had high 
visibility and links to media and government.53,84,103,109,111 As 
elucidated by Kaiser et al,48 such groups often work across 
government and civil society to construct robust measures 
which bridge tensions and are less susceptible to hijacking 
by detractors. However, Barraclough and Morrow,72 Higashi 
et al74 and Mapa-Tassoa et al,78 found that the power of civil 
institutions diminished when targeted commodities had high 
public acceptance or where state ownership or sponsorship 
stifled the proposition of change. 
Multilateral Actors
Direct support by multilateral agencies, NGOs and 
philanthropic trusts was identified to expedite the design and 
implementation of fiscal measures. While the WHO was held 
in high regard for their technical advice,45,55,60,63,98 sources also 
highlighted multisectoral consensus building to derive from 
engagement with the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), IMF, the World Bank, and other national and 
international NGOs and philanthropic trusts.53,61,62,68,71,73,104,113 
Locally-based offices of multilateral agencies, seed 
organisations and links between multi-lateral actors and local 
organisations sometimes blurred the boundaries between 
multilateral and civil society action. Financing and the 
supplementation of national economic, technical and legal 
capacities were the predominant forms of support, with each 
noted to be beneficial in overcoming common LMIC capacity 
constraints.53,60,61
Process
Literature provided insights into 4 domains, also commonly 
identified in policy process theory114-119: the strategic 
portrayal of policy problems and fiscal solutions – often called 
‘framing’120, the forms and use of evidence, inter-ministerial 
policy dynamics and policy implementation.
Framing
Literature identified three central frames: pro-health, pro-
economic and (often industry-induced) scepticism of fiscal 
measures.24,50-52,55,64,81 As argued by Kaiser et al,48 these three 
unidimensional frames foster policy coalitions capable of 
elevating issues onto the political agenda. This was evidenced 
in links between multinational corporations, small business 
and unions in response to potential employment repercussions 
of fiscal measures55,65,83; and in coalitions formed between 
health professionals and families with claims of industry 
putting profits before health.52,53,92 
The design and implementation phases of fiscal measures 
sometimes saw the emergence of nuanced frames capable of 
bridging more disparate interests.53 Onagan et al63 observed 
that measures framed with exclusive health or revenue 
objectives gained less inter-ministerial traction than those 
proposing dual objectives. The ‘win-win’ phraseology,121-123 
often used to account for the projected health and economic 
benefits of fiscal health policy, is hence a particularly useful 
and well used frame for uniting otherwise disparate coalitions 
around mutually-beneficial goals.43,48,50,51,55,60,63 
Alignment with the global health agenda, insofar as 
ratification of FCTC67,99,110,112 and revenue generation to 
support universal health coverage,42,46,48 were also beneficial 
frames capable of driving implementation. While evidence-
based frames, which drew on diverse projections of impacts, 
were most likely to mobilise ideologically and politically 
dissimilar audiences; giving political and social traction to 
measures.48,53,63,71,73,85,98,104 This dynamic is best demonstrated 
by the Philippines’ and Thailand’s additional revenue 
investments in health, which led to policy backing by health-
interested parties rather than those solely interested in 
economic benefits.48,52,63,124 
Evidence
The role of local, regional, global and industry-endorsed 
evidence was discussed in 45 papers (60%). As a whole, the 
literature emphasised that fiscal measures gained traction from 
diverse types of country-specific evidence.47,52,55,56,63,74,81,84,87,91 
As articulated by Higashi et al47 and Hamann et al113 
however, the appetite for context-specific evidence is not 
always matched by research availability, affordability or the 
capacity of LMIC governments and research institutions. 
Paucity of local evidence often forced governments to 
choose between stalling policy to await relevant evidence or, 
acknowledging momentum and proceeding with suboptimal 
information.49,52,74,79,85,113 Diffusion of regional or global 
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evidence was beneficial in progressing fiscal measures and 
supported by pro-policy political elites and global health 
bodies.15,55,60 The use of more generalised data however was 
often criticised by industry and those opposing measures.24,52,86 
In such instances, the availability of local albeit poorer quality 
evidence, often favouring or funded by industry, was enough 
to seed doubt amongst policy-makers, forcing compromise or 
delay.66,73,79
Evidence was predominantly used to justify measures by 
highlighting the magnitude of health burden or economic 
deficit.15,24,42,60,82,91,101,109,111 Commonly identified evidence 
included consumption patterns, disease burdens, price 
elasticity and revenue or health projections associated with 
policy initiation.15,24,42,53,63,81,82,91,109,111 Such evidence was 
beneficial in countering industry claims,42,56,61 supporting 
technical provisions,55 and mobilising and sustaining civil 
society groups and messaging.76,81 However across the 
literature, evidence was almost exclusively used to justify 
implementation but not inform the design of policy per se.80 
Further, while few papers explicitly acknowledged 
the central role of political process on the design and 
implementation of measures, a handful of papers did recognise 
what is best surmised by Chantornvong et al105: that policy 
success depends as much on forms of “political evidence” 
as it does the application of health and economic specific 
knowledge.33,48,51,73,80,97,105 However, even amongst papers 
where political considerations were acknowledged, there 
remained limited empiric analysis and continued reliance on 
commentary, with the noteworthy exception of Kaiser and 
colleagues’48 political economy insights from the Philippines. 
As Sanni et al97 attest, technical evidence alone is insufficient 
to address politically contentious issues. Given the potential 
for political economy considerations to contribute positively 
to policy adoption, the deficit of evidence pertaining to 
political process and power dynamics is likely to be a missed 
opportunity to improve the design and implementation of 
measures.33,48,51,73,74,80,84,97,105 
Inter-Ministerial Policy Dynamics 
The multisectoral nature of fiscal measures requires policy 
development to bring together an extensive stakeholder 
base with diverse and, at times, conflicting priorities. At 
the intersection of health, trade, financial and agricultural 
interests, fiscal measures commonly fuel conflicts over policy 
jurisdictions.44,47,53,56,70,71,73,76,91,97 As outlined by Abediyi et al70 
while dependent on framing and government objectives, 
cross-ministerial negotiations commonly stall or mitigate 
adoption. Pitso et al49 and Bump et al73 assert that, particularly 
in LMICs, inter-ministerial power asymmetries often favour 
financial and trade interests over health. If health measures 
are designed as part of broader fiscal reform, as was the case 
in Mexico60 and Tonga’s second and third iterations,58 this 
can accelerate implementation and permit governments to 
promote dual health and economic benefits.42,91 By contrast, 
when public sector and political officials perceive fiscal 
measures to challenge trade or economic interests, policy is 
often thwarted or enacted with health trade-offs.48 Protection 
of state-owned commodity producers and, as Abedian et al54 
identify, the avoidance of earmarking revenue, are identified 
as 2 common trade-offs.72,74 In particular, earmarking is likely 
to draw opposition from national finance departments where, 
Van Walbeek56 argues, it may be perceived as economically 
inefficient and a violation of their role as gatekeepers of public 
financing. A push for earmarking, particularly when there 
is a distinct power imbalance between health and finance 
departments, has been identified by some sources to risk 
destabilising necessary multisectoral support for adoption of 
such measures.42,54-57 
Despite the frequency of inter-ministerial conflicts in this 
space, papers also identified instances of inter-ministerial 
collaboration and its positive implications on the design and 
implementation of fiscal measures.15,43,48,52,58,63,71,79,80,91,101,104,108,111 
Often linked to strategically developed multisectoral 
coalitions, the literature emphasised the importance of 
coordinating policy responses,76,89 and striving for genuine 
integration.79,91,111 Acknowledging the diverse interests of 
stakeholders, Coriakula et al101 highlight the effectiveness 
of inter-sectoral committee mechanisms in ensuring 
collaborative and iterative policy development capable of 
harmonising and overcoming potential policy conflicts.
Implementation
Notwithstanding the automated nature of taxation 
compared to other policy instruments,125 included literature 
outlined poor resourcing, vested interests and the lack of 
timely monitoring as implementation challenges prone to 
undermining the success of fiscal measures. Insufficient 
supportive resourcing was identified as significantly 
impacting implementation.50,76,79,82,87,110,124 As noted by Barber 
and Ahsan,83 this was particularly apparent in administering 
tiered taxation measures prone to industry manipulation and 
insufficient oversight. Producers and suppliers were also found 
to engage in a range of tactics to undermine the effectiveness 
of implemented measures, including relabelling,50,101 
absorbing taxation to maintain market share,51,83 supporting 
the importation of cheaper alternatives,51,83 and price over-
adjustment to sustain profits.67 These tactics were also 
commonly aided by concurrent political disunity. Competing 
government interests and complex policy sign-off processes 
were identified as factors responsible for delaying the 
implementation of measures.50,59,84,90,92,97,98,103,104,110 Similar 
challenges, coupled with ill-defined success, insufficient 
resourcing and complex causal pathways were also identified 
as limiting effective policy monitoring and evaluation.24,42,51,83 
Thus, frequently, little is known about the intended or 
unintended consequences of measures, as required to inform 
future adjustments. 
Context 
Policy context analysis recognises that policy actors and 
processes exist within a context that ultimately influences the 
design and outcome of reform. Leichter’s40 distinction between 
interlinked situations, structural, cultural and exogenous/
international factors is a useful heuristic for consideration of 
contextual factors and their influence on policy. 
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Situational Factors
Situational factors encompass focusing events or diffuse 
recognition of issues which elicit a policy response.40 
The majority of papers linked fiscal measures to diffuse 
recognition, while some included papers (n = 23) explicitly 
delved into the situational “tipping point” responsible for 
the ideation of measures. From a health standpoint, lobbying 
from civil society was identified as beneficial in elevating 
the health burden and potential solution represented by 
fiscal measures with respect to the public, media and 
political agendas.80,82,97,98,110 Comparative analysis of tobacco 
measures by Sanni et al97 highlighted how the emergence 
of context-specific, localised evidence justified expedited 
implementation in South Africa, while similar measures 
stalled in Togo without such localised evidence. Far more 
frequently, however, demand for government revenue 
expansion was used to justify the design and implementation 
of measures.24,46,48,51,53,60,78,91,92,100,109,126 This was commonly 
linked to shrinking revenue from exports,91 increased 
demand for public expenditure,48,91 the ramifications of trade 
liberalisation on import tariffs24,51,53,78,100 and state-ownership 
or monopolies.46,92,109 While revenue generation motives were 
effective in garnering initial support from economically-
interested parties, as articulated by Kaiser et al,48 the design 
of measures necessitates the incorporation of a broader 
perspective, such as good governance or pro-poor sentiments, 
to sustain necessary backing from stakeholders. 
While not sparking issue recognition per se, election 
periods and political change-overs commonly enabled the 
implementation of fiscal measures.56,61,68,81,82,97,101,109,110 As a 
legacy of exiting leaders or the fulfilment of election promises 
by incumbents, fiscal measures that had already gained 
recognition on the policy agenda, were often expedited during 
leadership change-over.56,61,68,81,82,97,101,109,110
Structural Factors
Despite the heterogeneity of LMIC contexts, papers commonly 
outlined demographic and epidemiological challenges; 
capacity constraints and institutional norms as interlinked 
structural influences on fiscal measures in LMICs. 
The economic development status of countries affected 
political and public receptiveness to proposed fiscal policy 
solutions to NCDs. For example, the double burden of 
NCDs and communicable diseases127 experienced by many 
LMICs was, as previously articulated, detrimental to NCD 
prioritisation.49,76,87,89,104,105,112 However, various sources 
found that globalisation, urbanisation and climate change-
induced food insecurity had amplified the burden of NCDs; 
increasing demand for effective policy responses.24,50,58,59,62 
Population growth and increasing wealth have also made 
LMICs a more favourable market for the sellers of harmful 
commodities.48,70-72,82,83,90,98,99,103,104,124 
Development-associated capacity constraints also challenge 
the design and implementation of fiscal measures. These 
include financial constraints,73,76,78,79,82,87,92,104,110,124 insufficient 
human resource and technical capacities to effectively negotiate 
trade deals,45,50,59,90,103 and sufficient resources to monitor and 
adjust fiscal measures where necessary.15,47,55,68,71,72,74,81,84,85,97,112 
The political structure and prevailing institutional 
norms also govern how states engage in the design and 
implementation of fiscal measures. Literature identified state-
ownership15,47,64,68,72,74,75,104; culture of industry engagement 
and acceptance of their framing of issues59,66,77,86,93; inter-
ministerial hierarchies44,47,73,82; policy space afforded to civil 
society53,68,72,78,104; and, on one cited occasion, neoliberalism,98 
as norms that shaped measures. The impact of these norms 
is best exemplified by the contrasting successes in tobacco-
related measures in post-Apartheid South Africa56,81 and 
challenges posed by state-ownership and industry influence 
on measures in Indonesia,68 China,75 and Vietnam.47,74,104 
Cultural Factors
Cultural factors, inclusive of history, religious sentiments and 
social structures have had a distinct influence on the design 
and implementation of fiscal measures.40 Commonly linked 
to consumption trends and cultural significance65,68,89,98 and 
historic links between government and local commodity 
producers49,54,56,64,66,71,72,81,82,85,94,97,98 cultural factors were often 
identified as key stalling points in the adoption of fiscal 
measures. As identified by Barraclough and Morrow72 and 
Ferreira-Borges et al,89 these factors were sometimes exploited 
by industry and those sympathetic to industry to delay or seed 
doubts around measures’ viability. By contrast, Achadi et al65 
and Hoe et al109 found that religious objections to tobacco 
were beneficial in fostering a favourable political climate 
for fiscal measures in Indonesia and Turkey respectively. 
Growing nationalism also supported fiscal measures in post-
apartheid South Africa56,71,81,84 and in response to pressure 
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for tobacco 
market liberalisation in Thailand.33,52,92,105 Papers by Thow et 
al51 and FAO et al,58 also indicated that measures often faced 
less objection in jurisdictions with a precedent for taxing 
harmful commodities. 
International/Exogenous Factors
The literature demonstrated that international factors had 
important and diverse influences on policy processes. Global 
factors supporting and inhibiting fiscal measures were 
identified in 51 papers (68%) and linked to trade agreements, 
the influence of multinational corporations and cross-border 
policy harmonisation.
The imposition of trade agreements on the control of 
harmful commodities was discussed in several papers. As 
outlined by Ferreira-Borges et al,89 trade agreements designed 
to reduce trade barriers, promote competition, lower prices 
and encourage consumption generally sit at odds with the goals 
of fiscal measures. By constraining regulatory action, trade 
agreements can limit policy space and fuel inter-ministerial 
conflict between trade and health.15,24,33,48,50,52,59,62,73,89 By 
provoking disputes or sanctions and impeding access to 
bodies such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), trade 
conditions complicate the design of fiscal measures.50,52,59 
Further, as argued by Baker et al,53 past trade litigation is 
often a barrier to future measures in different jurisdictions, a 
condition known as “regulatory chill.” LMICs are particularly 
vulnerable to the threat of retaliative action given their more 
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constrained trade, economic and legal capacities.53 
The provision of foreign aid based on particular trade 
conditions determined by donors can also hamper the 
implementation of fiscal measures in LMICs. New Zealand’s 
threat of sanctions against a number of Pacific island nations 
for their health-related bans and proposed bans on turkey 
tails and mutton flaps exemplified this.50,62 Bump and Reich33 
assert that such action demonstrates the power afforded to 
industry in influencing countries and, by extension, global 
trade policy. However, despite the limitations imposed by 
trade agreements, there is growing potential for evidence-
based carve-outs, permitting discriminatory taxes on products 
proven to be detrimental to health.24,50 Moreover, the literature 
also highlighted WTO accession mandates and the threat 
of sanctions to have instigated government-wide review of 
fiscal measures. Fuelled by a sense of urgency, sanctions and 
accession parameters favoured multisectoral-supported fiscal 
measures in Thailand, the Philippines and Samoa.33,48,52,62,92,105
The growing transnational nature of industries 
themselves is also responsible for stalling and impeding 
the adoption of measures. Holden and Lee100 outline that 
the multinational nature of many harmful commodity 
producers fosters transnational coordination. Transnational 
action by corporations commonly includes global counter-
advertisement and lobbying,15,66,98,100 the development of 
transnational front groups,57,60,77,93,103 cross-jurisdictional 
information sharing,100 and offshoring or restructuring to 
minimise loss of market share or profitability.86,95,100,107 The 
transnational nature of negative retaliative action was most 
apparent in contexts where measures were not unanimously 
supported by domestic actors; reigniting inter-ministerial 
conflicts between trade and health.33,73 
Regional and global coalition building and direct support 
provision from multilateral organisations has however been 
advantageous in countering multinational corporations and 
supporting fiscal measures in LMICs. Information sharing 
and lesson-drawing commonly influenced policy processes 
and promoted policy transfer.42,45,48,52,54,61,71,78,100,103 Examples 
include the establishment of health promotion foundations, 
following successes of the Australian VicHealth model,15,42-52 
and regional harmonisation of taxation to mitigate 
smuggling.48,54,61,78,100,103 Hoe et al109 also emphasised cross-
country comparisons to be advantageous in informing policy 
processes, elevating dormant problems and their potential 
solutions onto national and international policy agendas. 
Similarly, policies and objectives that have achieved global 
consensus, such as FCTC and the SDGs, also support the 
design and implementation of fiscal measures. By fuelling 
international political momentum which, Bump and 
Reich argue,33 has the potential to trump domestic affairs, 
dominant global health discourse provides a prominent 
frame for issue conceptualisation and timely state compliance 
acts as a signifier of responsive governance. For example, 
Tobacco-related papers consistently identified FCTC as 
instrumental in issue identification and the design of state 
responses.42,65,68,72,74,78,79,82,85,87,97,103,105,108-110 As outlined by Tam 
et al103 and others, FCTC’s legally binding tobacco taxation 
provisions have fostered a sustained commitment to effective 
fiscal measures amongst signatory nations.79,85,103,108,109 Further, 
despite Indonesia not being a signatory, Achadi et al65 and 
Rosser68 also identify FCTC to have garnered momentum 
and supported a review of tobacco control measures in light 
of the framework’s health and economic provisions. While 
not legally binding, a range of other global policies, including 
the NCD Best Buys and global and regional action plans on 
NCDs have also aided consensus building and mainstreamed 
fiscal solutions.15,76,80,87 More lateral global health objectives, 
including the SDGs and universal health coverage, have also 
been leveraged by states to justify fiscal measures as a means 
of increasing health budgets.46,48,58,63 
Drawing on detail included in Supplementary file 4 and 
narrative summaries provided above, a summary of the state 
of the literature on health fiscal measures literature can be 
found in Table 2.
Discussion
The design and implementation of health-related fiscal 
measures in LMICs is shaped by a complex network of factors 
that vary across contexts. Nonetheless some commonalities 
were identified by this scoping review. Fiscal measures were 
more likely to be implemented when diverse local health 
and economic evidence sources were available; policies were 
championed by those in government and had inter-ministerial 
support; stakeholders from different sectors engaged in 
regular, open dialogue; and when regional and global political 
winds favoured change. Fiscal measures were less likely to be 
adopted when framing of issues and solutions were influenced 
by industry; real and perceived retaliative threats were made 
by powerful actors; during political climates of trade insecurity 
and regulatory chill; and when disharmony and vested 
Table 2. State of Fiscal Measures Evidence Delineated by Subject Matter, Methodology/Focus and Content of Analysis
Subject •	 There was a concentration of papers analysing tobacco-specific fiscal measures and an under-representation of research focused on food, alcohol or other beverage-related fiscal measures.
Methodology/focus
•	 Majority of the included literature is less than a decade old pointing to the relative infancy of this area of policy 
analysis. 
•	 The literature demonstrated a concentration of papers analysing policy actors and, in particular, the influence of 
industry on the design and implementation of measures. 
•	 Insufficient attention was paid to the influence of neoliberalism and power dynamics on the policy process.
Content of analysis 
•	 Local evidence, policy championing by political elites, inter-ministerial support and engagement and favourable global 
winds for change were identified as drivers of fiscal measures.
•	 Industry influence and retaliation, trade insecurity and regulatory chill, inter-ministerial policy disharmony and vested 
interests were identified to have challenged or prevented the design and implementation of fiscal measures.
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interests prevented policy consensus within government. 
Overall, these factors suggest some important distinctions 
between HICs and LMICs in the design and implementation 
of fiscal measures, as is summarised in Table 3.
Gaps in the Analysis Food, Alcohol and Other Beverages 
This review demonstrated a substantial gap in research 
focused on food, alcohol or other beverage-specific fiscal 
measures, with the current literature reflective of the sustained 
global emphasis on tobacco regulation and taxation. Given 
the increasing momentum for broader policies in response 
to NCDs, the lack of in-depth analysis devoted to these 
areas signifies a failure to provide relevant and actionable 
evidence to support the design and implementation of fiscal 
measures. While lesson-drawing from tobacco is valid and, as 
emphasised by Dorfman et al,129 Nguyen et al,130 and Brownell 
and Warner,131 other industries have followed tactics used to 
resist tobacco regulation, an over-reliance on tobacco-specific 
literature fails to acknowledge the differences associated with 
other harmful commodities. There is hence a need for greater 
depth of research focused on a range of harmful commodity-
related fiscal measures to overcome the unstated assumption 
implied by much of the literature: that mechanisms used 
in tobacco taxation are directly replicable to measures 
targeting foods, alcohol and other beverages. For example, 
the literature’s predominant representation of industry as a 
homogenous entity risks over-simplifying policy challenges 
and may negate the influence of consumer perception and 
the versatility of the food and beverage industry in shaping 
regulations. 
Recognising Government and Civil Society Alongside Industry 
Actors 
This review also highlighted gaps in the breadth of policy 
actors identified, with many papers focused solely on the 
influence of industry. While important, particularly given 
the immense power afforded to industry actors in the 
political economies of LMICs, the literature’s preoccupation 
with industry precludes a more comprehensive assessment 
of the network of actors who influence the design and 
implementation of fiscal measures. For example, although 
only 38 studies (51%) examined inter-ministerial dynamics, 
sound relationships and agreement between state actors was 
pivotal to the fiscal measures’ success, and inter-ministerial 
conflicts often stalled or prevented measures. Given that 
public policy ultimately constitutes decisions made by state 
actors, the lack of attention to process dynamics and the views 
and actions of public persons and bodies is a critical gap in 
our understanding of how state actors negotiate competing 
interests. 
The Need to Explore Root Causes
Despite the emphasis placed on the influence of industry 
across the literature, very few papers explored potential root 
causes, with just Mambulu et al98 identifying neoliberalism as 
an underpinning determinant of private sector power. Global 
and local ideologies and dominant discourse are important 
contextual factors influencing the drive for and design of 
fiscal measures.132,133 With neoliberal policy preferences 
explicitly exported to LMICs as loan conditions from the IMF 
and World Bank in the 1990s,132 the pursuit of freer markets, 
with the promise of greater personal freedoms, peace and 
Table 3. A Summary Comparison of Study Findings With Recent HIC Literature22,24,28,42,128
Factors Similar Across LMICs and HICs Factors Unique to LMICs
Content •	 A common desire to balance the benefits of earmarking 
with the risk such mechanism poses to governance of 
public sector financing.
•	 Variance in taxation rates and scope across countries and 
between different products.
Actors •	 Industry influence commonly stalls and mitigates fiscal 
measures.
•	 Policy championing by state actors often accelerates 
implementation. 
•	 Industry influence is more pervasive, and nations experience 
constrained capacities to enforce industry-relevant regulations.  
•	 Greater role for multilateral financial and technical input into the 
design and implementation of measures.
Process •	 Limited research on the policy process of fiscal measures.
•	 The important influence of the framing of policy objectives 
on public and political debate.
•	 Inter-ministerial support for measures commonly 
accelerate their adoption.
•	 Embedding fiscal health measures in broader fiscal reform 
garners inter-ministerial support and can accelerate 
adoption.
•	 Limited context-specific evidence and constrained capacities to 
undertake policy-relevant research. 
•	 More acute inter-ministerial power asymmetries.
•	 More constrained capacities for implementing and evaluating 
measures.
Context •	 Historic precedence for taxing commodities has benefits 
from current-day advocates who support such measures.
•	 Constrained national budgets can incentivise revenue generation 
through fiscal measures but limit resources made available for 
effective design and implementation.
•	 A higher prevalence of communicable diseases and lower health 
budgets constrain NCD-related action.
Abbreviations: LMICs, low- and middle-income countries, HICs, high-income countries; NCDs, non-communicable diseases.
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prosperity, remains a dominant global discourse. Encouraging 
trade, discouraging market regulation and, in turn, arguably 
promoting ‘consumptagenic systems,’134 neoliberalism sits 
at the heart of the escalating burden of NCDs and dictates 
the terms of potential remedial action.135 The scale, reach 
and wealth of corporations, particularly multi-national 
conglomerates, and their ability to mitigate and manipulate 
fiscal measures highlights an important power asymmetry 
between countries’ health interests and the economic interests 
of powerful private actors. However, some promise is found 
in recent support for fiscal measures by the IMF and World 
Bank and the implementation of measures by conservative 
governments.24,60,126 The altered stance of these agencies and 
governments demonstrates the possibility of reorientating 
the neoliberal agenda to recognise the importance and 
potential returns associated with investing in the health of 
‘human capital.’136 Further research is necessary to explore 
the breadth of neoliberalism’s influence, as we currently have 
an incomplete picture of the barriers, tensions and political 
opportunities in assessing the feasibility of fiscal measures as 
a form of responsive public policy. 
Recognising Other Forms of Evidence
Many studies discussed the need for and use of health and 
economic evidence in the enactment of fiscal measures. 
However, while plentiful, evidence was almost exclusively 
discussed in relation to agenda setting. For example, country-
specific data on disease prevalence and consumption of 
harmful commodities were identified as integral in driving 
public and political momentum for change. Yet analyses of 
policy design processes and policy content often demonstrated 
that technical detail became obsolete in negotiation processes, 
when garnering support from diverse stakeholders was 
paramount. This demonstrates a disjuncture in the evidence 
used during agenda setting and that used in the design of 
fiscal measures. Further, echoing Bump, Reich, Chantornvong 
and others,33,73,92,105,137 a deepening of policy analysis and 
recognition of other types of evidence necessary to inform the 
design and implementation of public policy is required. For 
example, integration of political economy considerations into 
prospective and retrospective analysis is likely to bring to light 
important dynamics integral to successful policy.
Strengths and Limitations
This study draws inspiration from the political economy 
approach outlined in Bump and Reich’s seminal work,33 
but is distinct in its inclusion of fiscal measures relating to 
a broad range of harmful commodities (not just tobacco-
related products). Our focus on LMICs also differentiates this 
analysis from more globally oriented work by Wright et al25 
and Hagenaar et al.24 Application of a systematic approach 
and theory-driven analysis also allow us to add depth to 
observations made in Bridge and colleagues’ more general 
exploration of LMIC experiences and potential pitfalls in 
sugar-sweetened beverage taxation.34
Several limitations must also be noted. The choice of 
databases, repositories and exclusion of primary policy sources 
may have inadvertently limited the identification of relevant 
papers. Given the breadth of languages spoken across LMICs, 
the exclusion of papers published in languages other than 
English may also have led to the exclusion of relevant articles. 
While developed iteratively, predominately single author 
screening, coding and analysis may also have unintentionally 
excluded information of relevance although robust discussion 
between authors and review by the third author was designed 
to minimise this. The study’s reliance on secondary sources 
also creates the potential for misinterpretation. Embedding 
expert consultation as a final stage in the study’s design may 
also have strengthened findings. 
Conclusion
This study’s identification and mapping of literature exploring 
and explaining the policy process of fiscal measures in LMICs 
reveals important findings for policy-makers and researchers 
alike. 
Highlighting critical and interconnected factors influencing 
fiscal measures in LMICs, this study identifies a number 
of valuable lessons for future fiscal measures. The use of 
local health and economic evidence, policy championing, 
multisectoral engagement and inter-ministerial support, and 
global or regional momentum and technical support appear 
beneficial to the design and implementation of measures. 
By contrast industry framing and potential retaliation, 
vested interests and policy disjuncture across government 
were common factors associated with stalled or mitigated 
measures. Recognition of the presence or absence of these 
factors and intentional planning with such considerations in 
mind may hence support LMIC policy-makers in designing 
and implementing effective fiscal measures. 
While acknowledging that what is known should inform 
policy, it is also pivotal that what remains unknown 
informs future research. As such, this study has highlighted 
considerable gaps in our understanding of the global, regional 
and national political economies which shape fiscal measures. 
A greater emphasis on empirical research that seeks to 
understand the context-specific power dynamics and the 
political intricacies of processes associated with the design 
and implementation of fiscal measures in LMICs is hence 
integral.
The growing burden of NCDs, and how it manifests in 
LMICs, is itself a product of political and economic forces. 
Effective policies responses hence demand evidence that 
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